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Infection of healthcare workers with the severe acute
respiratory syndrome–associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
is thought to occur primarily by either contact or large res-
piratory droplet transmission. However, infrequent health-
care worker infections occurred despite the use of contact
and droplet precautions, particularly during certain aerosol-
generating medical procedures. We investigated a possible
cluster of SARS-CoV infections in healthcare workers who
used contact and droplet precautions during attempted
cardiopulmonary resuscitation of a SARS patient. Unlike
previously reported instances of transmission during
aerosol-generating procedures, the index case-patient was
unresponsive, and the intubation procedure was performed
quickly and without difficulty. However, before intubation,
the patient was ventilated with a bag-valve-mask that may
have contributed to aerosolization of SARS-CoV. On the
basis of the results of this investigation and previous
reports of SARS transmission during aerosol-generating
procedures, a systematic approach to the problem is out-
lined, including the use of the following: 1) administrative
controls, 2) environmental engineering controls, 3) person-
al protective equipment, and 4) quality control.
D
uring the global spread of severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) (1–5), a great deal was discovered
about the illness and the SARS-associated coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) (6,7). SARS-CoV infection is thought to
occur primarily by either contact or large respiratory
droplet transmission (3,8). However, despite the use of
infection control precautions and personal protective
equipment designed to prevent contact and droplet trans-
mission, episodes of SARS-CoV transmission to health-
care workers have continued to occur under certain cir-
cumstances. 
Of particular concern are procedures performed on
SARS patients that may aerosolize SARS-CoV and lead to
limited airborne transmission or enhanced contact and
droplet transmission (9). Such procedures include nonin-
vasive positive pressure ventilation (BiPAP), intubation,
and high-frequency oscillatory ventilation. As a result,
special infection control procedures have been recom-
mended for aerosol-generating procedures (10,11). We
present the results of an investigation of the first reported
transmission of SARS-CoV to healthcare workers that
occurred during attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation
of a completely unresponsive SARS patient. On the basis
of the results of this investigation, as well as previous
reports of SARS transmission during aerosol-generating
procedures, we used the continuous quality improvement
framework (12) to suggest interventions for preventing
future episodes of transmission. 
Methods
Data were collected through interviews of healthcare
workers present during the attempted cardiopulmonary
resuscitation where transmission of SARS-CoV was
thought to have occurred. Interviews included a structured
questionnaire component. Hospital and provincial policies
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Laboratory specimens, collected with nasopharyngeal
swabs, were obtained from healthcare workers with symp-
toms that fulfilled the SARS clinical case definition after
exposure during the attempted cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion. These were tested by reverse transcriptase–poly-
merase chain reaction (RT-PCR) with primers specific for
SARS-CoV (7). After participants gave informed consent,
convalescent-phase serum was collected from all consent-
ing healthcare workers exposed to the attempted resuscita-
tion event as part of a larger seroprevalence study of
hospital staff. For this, samples were analyzed with a com-
mercially available indirect immunofluorescent assay
(Euroimmune, Lübeck, Germany) according to the direc-
tions of the manufacturer. 
In addition, a limited evaluation of the Stryker T4
Personal Protection System (Stryker Instruments,
Kalamazoo, MI), worn by some of the healthcare workers
involved in the resuscitation attempt, was conducted to
estimate the operating parameters, including particle
removal efficiency and air-flow rate. A Met One Model
227B Hand-Held Particle Counter (Met One, Inc., Grants
Pass, OR) was used to count ambient particles outside and
inside the hood; five replicates were collected for each
condition over a 1-minute sampling period. All informa-
tion was obtained as part of an ongoing joint investigation
into the cause of the second phase of the Toronto SARS
outbreak conducted by Toronto Public Health, Health
Canada, and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (13). 
Case Report
A 67-year-old woman with a history of asthma was
admitted to hospital A on May 24, 2003, with a 5 day his-
tory of fever, cough, malaise, headache, and myalgias. The
patient’s mother had recently been admitted to the same
hospital and died of a nosocomial pneumonia after ortho-
pedic surgery for a fractured hip. On the basis of clinical
findings and the identification of secondary infections in
exposed persons, the mother’s death was retrospectively
determined to be due to SARS. On admission, the patient
was febrile and her chest radiograph showed left lower
lobe and lingular infiltrates. Both acute-phase serologic
tests and serum RT-PCR were positive for SARS-CoV
(National Microbiology Laboratory, Health Canada,
Toronto). She was admitted to the hospital and placed in
respiratory isolation on the SARS unit. Progressive respi-
ratory failure later developed in the patient, and within
72 hours of admission, she required 100% supplemental
oxygen. On May 28, 2003, she was found to have no vital
signs and cardiopulmonary resuscitation was attempted.
Nine healthcare workers participated in the resuscita-
tion attempt. Three ward nurses (RN1–3) were the initial
responders (Table). RN1 performed chest compressions
while RN2 and RN3 prepared suction, oxygen, and intuba-
tion equipment. Three intensive care unit nurses (ICU-
RN1–3), two respiratory therapists (RT1 and 2), and a
physician (MD) also participated in the resuscitation. ICU-
RN1 took over chest compressions from ward-RN1. ICU-
RN2 inserted a peripheral intravenous catheter (IV) in the
left foot of the patient and administered medications via
the IV during the resuscitation attempt. ICU-RN3 ventilat-
ed the patient with a bag-valve-mask, without a
bacterial/viral filter. RT1 performed the endotracheal intu-
bation, which was completed in <30 seconds. No suction-
ing was required during or after the intubation and no
respiratory secretions or other bodily substances were
observed in the environment. A bacterial/viral filter was
placed on the bag-valve-mask after the intubation.
All nurses in the room during the resuscitation were
wearing protection equipment that was considered stan-
dard for routine SARS patient care at this hospital. This
equipment consisted of two gowns, two sets of gloves,
goggles, a full-face shield (with the exception of RN1 and
RN2), shoe covers, hair cover, and NIOSH-approved N95
disposable respirators that were not fit-tested. In addition,
all nurses involved in the resuscitation were experienced in
working on SARS units and thus familiar with the recom-
mended infection control policies and procedures. In con-
trast to the nurses, both RTs and the MD were wearing T4
Personal Protection Systems during the resuscitation. All
nurses left the room immediately after the intubation and
removed their protection equipment following the standard
hospital protocol. Approximate exposure times are out-
lined in the Table. 
On the May 31, 2003, both ICU-RN1 and ICU-RN2
had a temperature >38.0°C, myalgia, and malaise. In addi-
tion, ICU-RN1 complained of headache and nausea, and
ICU-RN2 reported dyspnea. ICU-RN1 had a normal chest
radiograph results, but the radiograph of ICU-RN2 showed
a left lower lobe infiltrate that persisted for several days.
Both RNs were admitted to the hospital for observation;
their condition remained stable. RN3 reported a headache
and myalgia on June 1, 2003, but her maximum tempera-
ture reached only 37.8°C. She remained in home quarantine,
and her symptoms resolved without further progression.
Results of RT-PCR performed on nasopharyngeal swabs
from ICU-RN1 and ICU-RN2 were negative (7). At pres-
ent, only one case (ICU-RN2) meets the World Health
Organization criteria for probable SARS, one case (ICU-
RN1) is under investigation, and the third (RN3) does not
meet the case definition as her temperature remained
<38.0°C (14). A review of the 48-hour period before the
resuscitation did not show any other likely transmission
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the ICU and had little or no direct patient contact in the 48
hours before the resuscitation. Five of the nine healthcare
workers involved in the resuscitation agreed to participate
in serologic testing. All convalescent-phase samples were
collected >30 days after the event (Table).
Evaluation of the Stryker T4 Personal Protection
System indicated an average removal efficiency of 68%
for particles >0.5 µm in diameter and 54% for particles
>5 µm. This equates to a reduction factor (i.e., particles
outside of the hood would be reduced in number by this
factor) of 3.1 and 2.2, respectively. 
Discussion
This report describes the apparent transmission of
SARS-CoV from a patient to healthcare workers during an
attempted resuscitation. The similar symptom onset dates
suggest a point source of exposure. In this case, SARS-
CoV was transmitted despite healthcare workers’ wearing
protection equipment designed to protect against contact
and droplet transmission; no breaches in droplet protection
equipment were identified, and exposure times were fairly
brief. Although SARS transmission that involved intuba-
tion and BiPAP (9) have been reported, this episode is
unique in that the patient was neither conscious nor breath-
ing at the time of the intubation, and the intubation proce-
dure was performed quickly and without difficulty. These
factors make it less likely that transmission occurred as a
direct result of the intubation procedure. Instead, it is more
likely that transmission was related to events leading up to
the intubation. In this case, just as in previous cases, either
contact, droplet, or airborne transmission might have
occurred.
Direct and indirect contact are the most common forms
of transmission for most nosocomial pathogens; transmis-
sion between patients or from patient to healthcare worker
usually follows contamination of the healthcare workers’
hands after touching either the patient or a fomite that
came into direct contact with the patient. Large aerosol
droplets (i.e., >10 µm) can, in addition to contaminating
both animate and inanimate surfaces in close range of the
patient, travel short distances through the air and make
direct contact with the exposed mucous membranes of
healthcare workers or other patients.
In contrast, airborne transmission is mediated by respi-
ratory aerosols. These aerosols of infectious organisms con-
tain droplet nuclei <10 µm in size and, depending upon their
size within this range as well as ambient environmental
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Table. Healthcare worker exposures, personal protective equipment, and outcome  
Code team 
member  Tasks (duration of exposure)  Exposure time  Protective equipment 
Symptoms 
(onset) 
SARS serologic 
findings 
Ward RN1  Contact before code (120 min), 
compressions (<5 min), assisted IV 
insertion (5 min), observed code (10 min), 
wrap body (10–15 min) 
150–155 min  Gown x 2, gloves x 2, 
safety glasses, shoe 
covers, hair cover, N95 
respirator 
None  Refused testing 
Ward RN2  Set up suction equip (5 min), charting 
arrest record (15 min), wrapped body  
(10–15 min) 
30–35 min  Gown x 2, gloves x 2, 
safety glasses, face 
shield, shoe covers, hair 
cover, N95 respirator 
None  Negative 
Ward RN3  Set up oxygen equip (5 min), prepared 
intubation equipment (10 min), observed 
(5 min), wrapped body (10–15 min) 
30–35 min  Gown x 2, gloves x 2, 
safety glasses, face 
shield, shoe cover, hair 
cover, N95 respirator 
Headache, myalgia, 
Tmax 37.8°C (June 1) 
Negative 
ICU RN1  Chest compressions 
(10–15 min) 
10–15 min  Gown x 2, gloves x 2, 
safety glasses, face 
shield, shoe cover, hair 
cover, N95 respirator 
Headache, malaise, 
myalgia, nausea, Tmax 
38.0°C (May 31) 
Indeterminate 
ICU RN2  IV insertion in foot (<5 min), medication 
administration (10 min), application of 
EKG leads (<1 min) 
10–15 min  Gown x 2, gloves x 2, 
safety glasses, face 
shield, shoe cover, hair 
cover, N95 respirator 
Myalgia, malaise, SOA, 
Tmax 38.5°C (May 31) 
Positive 
ICU RN3  Ventilated patient with bag-valve-mask 
(5–10 min) 
5–10 min  Gown x 2, gloves x 2, 
safety glasses, face 
shield, shoe cover, hair 
cover, N95 respirator 
None  Negative 
RT1  Intubated patient (<30 s), ventilated 
patient with bag-valve-mask (10–15 min) 
10–15 min  T4 Personal Protection 
System, N95 respirator 
None  Refused testing 
RT2   Put filter on ETT and assisted RT1  
(5–7 min) 
5–10 min  T4 Personal Protection 
System, N95 respirator 
None  Refused testing 
MD  Chest compressions (5–7 min)  5–10 min  T4 Personal Protection 
System, N95 respirator 
None  Refused testing 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; RN1, ward nurse 1; RN2, ward nurse 2; RN3, ward nurse 3; ICU-RN1, intensive care unit nurse 1; ICU-RN2, intensive care 
unit nurse 2; ICU-RN3, intensive care unit nurse 3; RT1, respiratory therapist 1; RT2, respiratory therapist 2; MD, physician; IV, intravenous catheter; Tmax, maximum 
temperature; EKG, electrocardiogram; ETT, endotracheal tube conditions, can float on air currents and remain airborne for
many hours (15–18). A large variety of viruses (16,19–27)
are transmissible through both contact and airborne modes.
Often, investigation of the epidemiology of nosocomial
viral infections, establishes the occurrence of airborne
transmission (15).
Two explanations may account for the transmission
observed in this case: 1) an unrecognized breach in contact
and droplet precautions occurred, or 2) an airborne viral
load was great enough to overwhelm the protection offered
by droplet precautions, including non–fit-tested N95 dis-
posable respirators. If the last form of transmission was
responsible, airborne virus may have been generated by
the coughing patient (16) before her cardiopulmonary
arrest or due to a “cough-like” force produced by the air-
way pressures created during asynchronous chest com-
pressions and ventilations using the bag-valve-mask (28). 
Regardless of the exact mode of transmission in this
case, several lessons were learned through our investigation
that may help reduce the risk of transmission to healthcare
workers. A systematic approach to this problem is outlined
considering the following framework: 1) administrative
controls, 2) environmental engineering, 3) protection
equipment, and 4) quality control.
Administrative Controls
Policies and protocols for emergency resuscitation
involving patients known to have or suspected of having
SARS should include 1) description of the roles and respon-
sibilities of healthcare workers responding to the emer-
gency, 2) mechanisms to alert responders that the emer-
gency involves a potentially contagious patient (e.g.,
announcing the code as an “isolation code blue”), 3) steps
to limit the number of healthcare workers involved to min-
imize potential exposures, 4) plans for having auxiliary staff
staged in a safe area where they can be easily called on if
needed but otherwise preventing unnecessary exposure,
5) plans for safe disposal and cleaning of equipment used
during the emergency response, and 6) procedures for dis-
position of the patient after the emergency, either to the ICU
if resuscitation is successful or the morgue if unsuccessful.
Policies must be developed that consider all high-risk
exposures or emergency situations and not just individual
procedures. Policies that are too focused are of little value
in dealing with the hundreds of unforeseeable possible sit-
uations that may arise. Conversely, policies that educate
healthcare workers to assess the risks of a task and empow-
er them to take appropriate protective action will be more
effective. These policies should be crafted at each health-
care facility by a team that involves key stakeholders,
including persons involved in the clinical response along
with infection control practitioners and infectious disease
experts.
It is also important to minimize the chance that a patient
will suffer unwitnessed cardiopulmonary arrest or require
emergency intubation on a SARS unit. Prevention of these
events will involve two changes in policy. The first is to
recognize that isolation wards cannot be staffed with the
same nurse-to-patient ratio as a regular ward. Care of
patients in isolation is more time intensive due to both the
physical barriers (e.g., anterooms, doors kept closed at all
times) and the required use of protection equipment. The
nurse-to-patient ratio on the SARS ward at the time of the
arrest was between 1:4 and 1:5; a more ideal ratio might be
1:2 or 1:3. It is also necessary to have a lower threshold for
transferring patients to a higher acuity setting (i.e., ICU or
stepdown unit) when they first begin to show signs of a
clinical deterioration. To enable this, all patients on a
SARS unit should have measurement of vital signs along
with pulse oximetry at a minimum of every 4 hours.
Should their oxygen saturation drop below 92% on room
air one should administer oxygen through nasal prongs
1–4 L per minute to maintain saturation >92%, and
increase vital signs/pulse oximetry to every 2 hours. If the
patient subsequently requires oxygen through nasal prongs
at >4 L per minute the responsible physician should be
notified and increase vital signs or pulse oximetry to every
1 hour. Finally, if the patient requires supplemental oxygen
of >40% to maintain saturation >92%, the patient should
be transferred to the intensive care unit and undergo elec-
tive intubation in a controlled manner. This later policy has
worked well in other SARS units, as well as in hospital A
after it was implemented by one of the authors (M.L.) after
this cluster.
Finally, policies should be developed to address the
appropriateness and application of advanced cardiac life
support for patients suffering cardiopulmonary arrest on a
SARS ward. Many considerations must enter into any such
discussion, including the usefulness and outcome of resus-
citation efforts, particularly in unwitnessed arrests
(29–31). Despite even the most well-planned and well-
written policies, if healthcare workers are not trained in
proper infection control practices, SARS will continue to
be transmitted. Staff must be trained in both the application
of policies as well as the use of protection equipment. In
addition to education, practice is also important; for exam-
ple, consideration should be given to staging one or more
“mock SARS code blue” events. 
Environmental Controls
The second line of defense against the transmission of
SARS is environmental engineering controls. These con-
sist of physical engineering elements such as negative
pressure rooms, dilution ventilation, high-efficiency par-
ticulate air filtration, ultraviolet lights, and scavenging
devices. The primary goal of environmental engineering
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and to minimize or rapidly decrease the viral load in the
environment so that in the event of a breach in infection
control process or protection equipment, the chance of
healthcare workers or other patients becoming infected is
minimized. In this case, a breach occurred in source con-
trol; the initial bag-valve-mask used in the resuscitation
did not have a viral/bacterial filter on the exhaust. This
breach may have resulted in “uncontrolled” release of
aerosolized virus into the environment. However, previous
studies with coxsackie virus showed that little or no virus
is detectable in expired air, only in respiratory aerosols and
droplets from coughing or sneezing (16,21).
Personal Protective Equipment
The final line of protection against occupational expo-
sure is protection equipment. The use of N95 respirators
offers a level of protection against airborne transmission of
SARS. However, for any form of respiratory protection to
perform at the level of its full potential, it must be proper-
ly fitted to provide an adequate seal. The N95 disposable
respirators used by healthcare workers in this instance
were not fit-tested to ensure an adequate seal. Thus the
exact level of protection afforded by the N95 respirators
for each person in this case is unknown. Nonetheless, a
higher level of respiratory protection should be considered
in environments with a potentially very high SARS-CoV
load, such as that associated with aerosol-generating pro-
cedures 
As a result of the transmission of SARS Co-V during
aerosol-generating procedures, some hospitals in Ontario,
Canada, have adopted use of the T4 Personal Protective
System (Stryker Instruments) (Figure 1). This system was
originally designed to maintain a highly sterile field during
surgery to prevent operative site infections. 
As a form of protection equipment, this system has both
advantages and disadvantages. The primary advantage is
that the entire body of the healthcare worker is covered,
providing a high level of droplet protection. The primary
disadvantage of the T4 is the length of time required to put
one on during an emergency. In the emergency resuscita-
tion described in this report, the delay in certain rescuers
responding was due to the time required to put on the T4.
This resulted in the need for a second code blue to be
announced for the same patient, which drew additional
personnel to the code and thus increased the number of
healthcare workers exposed to SARS. 
The healthcare worker must also be attentive to avoid
contamination when removing the T4. Moreover, the air-
borne reduction factors of 3.1, for particles >0.5 µm in
diameter, and 2.2 for particles >5 µm were less than the
protection factor of 10 that is assigned (i.e., minimum
expected in practice) for a fit-tested, disposable N95 respi-
rator. However, a disposable N95 is commonly worn under
the T4 used in Ontario hospitals, suggesting the respirato-
ry protection afforded healthcare workers using the T4
would be greater.
The powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs) most
commonly used in healthcare settings have a disposable
full hood with face shield covering the healthcare worker’s
upper body (Figure 2). This device provides a higher level
of protection against airborne infectious agents (any PAPR
equipped with a hood or helmet with any type of particu-
late air filter has an assigned protection factor of 25 [32]),
and it may be faster and easier to apply in an emergency
situation. Finally, ensuring that a hospital has adequate
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Figure 1. A, T4 Stryker suit being applied with aid of assistants. B, Healthcare worker in T4 Stryker suit. Photos provided by Randy Wax
and Laurie Mazrik, Ontario Provincial SARS Biohazard Education Team.
A Bprotection against airborne diseases, even if not absolutely
required for SARS, will ensure that staff are prepared to
deal with future emerging infectious diseases or bioterror-
ism events that could involve airborne agents.
Regardless of what device (T4 versus PAPR) is used in
an institution for potentially aerosol generating proce-
dures, it is essential that they are distributed throughout the
hospital in areas where they are most likely to be required
by primary responders in an emergency situation as
opposed to a central area where teams must wait for them
to be brought to the emergency. In addition, extra protec-
tion equipment should be included as part of any “crash
cart” used by the responding code team.
Quality Control
Although there is a tendency to focus only on high-
tech forms of protection equipment, it is important not to
forget the basics of infection control procedures such as
glove changing and hand hygiene. Healthcare workers
must remain vigilant about not only protecting themselves
from SARS transmission but also protecting against
patient-to-patient transmission. As was found in the sec-
ond phase of the SARS outbreak in Toronto (13), one of
the best ways to prevent healthcare worker infections is to
ensure that no sustained transmission of SARS occurs
within the patient population, which may act as a reservoir
of infection.
After developing good policies and training staff who
are rehearsed for emergencies and provided with appropri-
ate protection equipment, the last step is to ensure ongoing
adherence to the standards set. This adherence is achieved
through quality control. Without an effective quality con-
trol program in place, lapses in infection control proce-
dures will occur, particularly as healthcare workers
become fatigued during a prolonged outbreak. 
Avariety of quality control methods can be implement-
ed, including administrative checks to ensure equipment is
in good repair, policies are current, and training materials
are up to date. Another quality control practice often used
by emergency services personnel dealing with hazardous
situations is the “buddy system.” In this system, healthcare
workers always work in teams on SARS units with each
person being responsible for double checking to make sure
that their partner is wearing appropriate equipment and fol-
lowing correct infection control practices before entering a
patient’s room. Finally, a process should be in place to
review responses to emergencies after they have occurred
to learn from the experience and facilitate continuous qual-
ity improvement.
Conclusion
SARS has increased the medical community’s aware-
ness of issues related to occupational health and safety. It
has also highlighted the importance of infection control
programs and practices. A systematic approach, including
administrative controls, environmental engineering, protec-
tion equipment, and quality control, is advocated to prevent
future SARS-CoV transmission to healthcare workers.
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